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RECENT DECISIONS
capable of "brutalizing the temper of society." However a standard
couched in terms of brutality appears to be a poor one. In most instances
its application would depend on the conduct initiated by the subject
rather than the police. Protection would be afforded primarily to those
who resisted. A better standard would appear to be based on a balancing
of the interests involved. Society's reason for the search should be bal-
anced against the potential invasion of privacy and other risks to the in-
dividual searched. 41 Such criteria should be in addition to, and not a
substitution for, traditional Fourth Amendment standards.
It is recognized that any such expansion of personal rights prob-
ably would involve the freeing of some obviously guilty individuals.
However, the standard thus laid down would provide criteria regulating
police conduct toward the innocent as well as the guilty. It is important
that the criminal element of society be controlled, but in the words of
F. B. I. Director J. Edgar Hoover:
Law enforcement, however, in defeating the criminal, must maintain
inviolate the historic liberties of the individual. To turn back the
criminal, yet, by so doing, destroy the dignity of the individual,
would be a hollow victory.42
JAMES POORE.
INTESTATE SUCCESSION: STEPCHILD MAY INHERIT UNDER A STATUTE PRO-
VIDING THAT THERE Is No DISTINCTION BETWEEN KINDRED OF THE WHOLE
AND HALF BLoOD.-William F. Humphrey died intestate, leaving as sur-
vivors his two brothers, several children of deceased brothers, and a
stepdaughter who was the natural daughter by a former marriage of his
deceased wife. When a nephew was appointed administrator of the
estate, the stepdaughter filed a cross-petition to revoke the letters of
administration and establish herself as administratrix. On motion to dis-
miss the cross-petition, held, denied. Under a statute eliminating the
common law distinction between kindred of the whole and half blood,
a stepchild may inherit from a stepparent who dies intestate. In re Estate
of Humphrey, 254 F. Supp. 33 (D. D. C. 1966).1
"Recently the Supreme Court applied a similar test in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). There the Court found the possibility that the law would allow
police to search the marital bedroom for signs of the use of contraceptives to be
repulsive to our notions of privacy, and hence, held the Connecticut contraceptive law
unconstitutional. Perhaps the drug laws should be examined with similar considera-
tions in mind by both the Court and the Congress.
"Hoover, Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the FBI, 37 IOwA L. REV.
175, 177 (1952).
'A "stepchild'' is the son or daughter of one's wife by a former husband, or of one's
husband by a former wife. In re Estate of Smith, 49 Wash.2d 229, 299 P.2d 550, 63
A.L.R.2d 299 (1956). "Half blood" is a term denoting the degree of relationship
which exists between those who have the same father or the same mother, but not
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At common law only persons related by whole blood to the decedent
could be heirs to real property, 2 and stepchildren were thus excluded.
Succession to personal property was governed by the English Statute of
Distribution of 1670, 3 and stepchildren could not inherit under this statute
since they were not related to the intestate by blood.4
In the United States, the common law rule remains intact,5 except
for some few instances of statutory modification.6 The majority of states
have statutes providing that half blood and whole blood kindred inherit
equally.7 However, they have interpreted these statutes as referring only
to persons who are related to the intestate by blood.8
A recent illustration of this view is In re Estate of Smith.9 In that
case, deceased was survived by two stepchildren and a daughter of his
natural son. He left a will in which he referred to the stepchildren as his
"children." The bulk of his property was to pass to his wife under a
residuary clause of the will, but she predeceased him, thus succession to
the residuary property was determined by the law of descent. The court
held that the stepchildren would not share in the residue; that it would
go to the granddaughter. The court interpreted the words of the half
blood statute'0 "kindred of the half blood" as referring to kindred of the
intestate and therefore having no application to stepchildren.
22 BLACKSTONE, COMMEN.ARIES *199.
122 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10.
'11 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND, § 41 (1910). Decisions interpreting the statute
held that there was no distinction between kindred of the half and whole blood, but
the reasoning underlying these decisions made it clear that they had no application
to the question of inheritance by stepchildren. The statute provided for distribution
to "kindred of the intestate who are in equal degree" and the courts interpreted this
to mean that half brothers of the decedent could inherit with whole brothers since
they were all kindred of the intestate of equal degree. It was clear that these
decisions were talking about the relation of the kindred to the intestate and not the
relation of the kindred to each other. See Smith v. Tracy, 1 Mod. 209, 86 Eng. Rep.
833 (K.B. 1673); Brown v. Farndell, Carth. 51, 90 Eng. Rep. 634 (K.B. 1689); Watts
v. Crooke, Show.P.C. 108, 1 Eng. Rep. 74 (1690).
6Cases holding that stepchildren do not inherit from intestate stepparents are:
Gazley v. Cornwell, 2 Redf.Sur. 139 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1874); In re Field, 182 App.
Div. 226, 169 N.Y. Supp. 677 (1918); Houston v. McKinney, 54 Fla. 600, 45 So.
480 (1907) ; Center v. Kramer, 112 Ohio St. 269, 147 N.E. 602 (1925); In re Wall's
Will, 216 N.C. 805, 5 S.E.2d 837 (1939); In re Paus' Estate, 324 Ill. App. 58, 57
N.E.2d 212 (1944); Carpenter v. Franklin, 228 Ark. 512, 308 S.W.2d 829 (1958);
In re Auclair 's Estate, 75 Cal. App. 2d 189, 170 P.2d 29 (Dis. Ct. App. 1945) ; Aubrey
v. Folsom, 151 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1957); In re Estate of Lima, 225 Cal. App. 2d
396, 37 Cal. Rptr. 404 (Dis. Ct. App. 1964); In re Estate of Smith, supra note 1.
4E.g., OHIo REV. CODE § 2105.06(I) (Anderson 1953), provides for distribution to
stepchildren when there are no next of kin before the property escheats to the state.7See summary of half blood statutes in Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 648.
8Finley v. Abner, 129 F. 734 (8th Cir. 1904); In re Long's Estate, 180 Okl. 28, 67
P.2d 41, 110 A.L.R. 1002 (1936); In re Pearson's Estate, 110 Cal. 524, 42 Pac. 960
(1895) ; In re MeKenna's Estate, 168 Cal. 339, 143 Pac. 605 (1914). See cases aupra
note 5 (either expressly or by implication).
'Supra note 1.
10WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.04.100 (1963):
The degree of kindred shall be computed according to the rules of the civil
law, and the kindred of the half blood shall inherit equally with those of
whole blood in the same degree unless the inheritance comes to the
intestate by descent, devise, or giA from one of his ancestors, or kindred
of such ancestor 's blood, in which case all those who are not of the blood
of such ancestors shall be excluded from such inheritance: Provided, how-
2
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The question of whether stepchildren can inherit under the intestacy
statute has never arisen in Montana. However, Montana's intestacy
statutes were derived from California," and cases construing California
statutes should be most persuasive. The law is well settled in California
that stepchildren do not inherit under the general intestacy statute, 12
and the statute on half bloods has no application.' 3 Further, the Cali-
fornia and Montana statutes contain ancestral property provisions stating
that half bloods can not inherit property coming to the intestate from one
of his ancestors, unless he is of the blood of the ancestor. 14 Even if step-
children were allowed to inherit under the half blood statute, they still
could not inherit ancestral property since they are generally not related
to the ancestor by blood.
The decision in the instant case was based on the District of Colum-
bia half blood statute providing that "There is no distinction between the
kindred of the whole and the half blood."'15 The court distinguished the
instant case from In re Estate of Smith, 6 saying that the District of Co-
lumbia statute was broader than the Washington statute 7 and should be
applied in any case involving the relative rights of persons of the whole
or half blood. Since stepchildren could be related by the half blood to
natural children, the court said there could be no distinction between
them. The court concluded that there was no reason why a different re-
sult should be reached if the deceased left only a stepchild and no
natural child of his own.
It is submitted that there is no authority for the proposition that
stepchildren inherit from intestate stepparents. The court's appplication
of the half blood statute where there is no blood relationship is clearly
ever, That the words "kindred of such ancestor's blood" and "blood of
such ancestors" shall be construed to include any child lawfully adopted
by one who is in fact of the blood of such ancestor.
"CAL. PROS. CODE §§ 220-231, are the general intestacy sections for California.
REvISFD CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 91-403 is the general intestacy statute for
Montana.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 254:
Kindred of the half blood inherit equally with those of the whole blood in
the same degree, unless the inheritance comes to the intestate by descent,
devise, or gift of some one of his ancestors, in which case all those who are
not of the blood of such ancestors must be excluded from such inheritance
in favor of those who are.
REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 91-411:
Kindred of the half-blood inherit equally with those of the whole blood
in the same degree, unless the inheritance comes to the intestate by descent,
devise, or gift of some one of his ancestors, in which case all those who are
not of the blood of such ancestors must be excluded from such inheritance.
"In re Auclair's Estate, supra note 5; Aubrey v. Folsom, supra note 5; In re Estate
of Lima, supra note 5.
"'Ibid. (by implication). Other cases, in construing the ancestral property provision,
make it clear the statute refers to the relation of the kindred to the intestate and
not the relation of the kindred to each other. See In re Pearson's Estate, supra note
8; In re MeKenna's Estate, supra note 8.
"'Supra note 11.
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out of line with the historical interpretation of such statutes. The court
emphasized that the statute is phrased in "broad, sweeping terms and con-
tains no limitations, 1 8 but the opposite result has been reached under
statutes that are almost identical.19 Moreover, it is difficult to see any
appreciable difference between the District of Columbia statute and
statutes providing that "kindred of the half blood inherit equally with
those of the whole blood in the same degree . . ."20 It is true that these
statutes have ancestral property provisions limiting such property to per-
sons who are of the blood of the ancestor, 2' but there is no reason why
such provisions would change the basic meaning of the statute.
Since persons frequently die intestate their property should be dis-
tributed according to some scheme or plan that can be consistently ap-
plied. This is accomplished by intestacy statutes which attempt to dis-
tribute property in an equitable manner. Blood relation has been a fun-
damental part of these statutes.22 Human experience has shown that a
high degree of affection generally exists between blood relatives, and
generally an intestate would prefer that a blood relative receive his
property.
On the other hand, the amount of affection found between persons
related only by affinity is far less predictable. While there may be a
great deal of love between stepparents and their stepchildren, there is
often complete indifference. In a case where the stepchild was loved and
raised by the stepparent, a decision like that in the instant case would
be reasonable. Conversely, it might be unreasonable if the stepchild
had been little more than a stranger to the decedent. Rather than al-
lowing stepchildren to inherit in all events, as the instant case does, it
would be preferable to give them limited rights of inheritance based on
the special circumstances of each case. This may result in increased liti-
gation, but the court or legislature should be able to establish workable
guidelines.
Before determining that stepchildren should inherit in a given cir-
cumstance, a number of factors should be considered. For example, to
determine what the decedent would have desired had he made a will, it
would be necessary to look at such facts as the age of the stepchildren and
whether they were raised in the stepparent's home. It might be signifi-
cant to determine if the decedent could have easily adopted them, or
why he failed to make a will.
"Instant case at 34.
1"Finley v. Abner, supra note 8, interpreting KAN. GEN. STAT. 1889, ch. 33 § 29.
Children of the half blood shall inherit equally with children of the whole blood.
In re Paus' Estate, supra note 5. ILLINOIS LAWS 1939, § 11 p. 4. In no case is there
any distinction between kindred of the whole and the half blood.
0This is the form of the Montana, California and Washington statutes. Supra notes
10 and 11.
11Supra notes 10 and 11.
2Tn re Bradley's Estate, 185 Wis. 393, 201 N.W. 973, 38 A.L.R. 1 (1925); rev'd on
other grounds, In re Nelson's Estate, 266 Wis. 617, 64 N.W.2d 406 (1954).
[Vol. 28
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A determination of the fairness of any distribution is likely to be
influenced by the needs of the stepchildren. For instance, they may have
been dependent on the stepparent because of age or physical disability.
Thus, it might seem unfair to evict a minor stepchild from decedent's
family home in favor of a distant relative who has no need for it himself.
Also, the death of the stepparent may place heavy burdens on a stepchild
who is left with a moral obligation to wind up the decedent's affairs.
Another consideration would be the nature of the property to be
distributed. If decedent's property was largely obtained from the step-
child's natural parent, it would seem manifestly unfair to exclude the
stepchild. The same would be true of property developed or acquired
through a joint family effort in which the stepchild participated. How-
ever, giving stepchildren a share in the family heirlooms or other senti-
mental property might lead to additional difficulties in an area already
a frequent source of family argument.
The instant case was clearly erroneous in its legal analysis. Further,
if the case is understood to stand for the proposition that stepchildren
inherit as natural children, it is unacceptable as a general rule of law.
However, if the decision had been based on a rule taking into considera-
tion the special circumstances of each case, the result would be quite
acceptable, since the decedent had no natural children and he raised the
stepdaughter as if she were his own.
JOSEPH T. SWINDLEHURST.
NEW TRIAL: USE OF AFFIDAVITS FROM JURORS TO IMPEACH THE VERDICT.
-After a verdict for defendant in an auto negligence case, counsel for
plaintiff submitted affidavits from jurors showing that the foreman
had made an independent investigation of the accident scene. Held:
Affidavits of jurors that bring to the court's attention facts of irregular-
ity and misconduct are competent to sustain a motion for a new trial.
Goff v. Kinzle, 417 P.2d 105 (Mont. 1966).
An English jury sitting in 1785 tossed a coin to determine a verdict.
Chief Justice Lord Mansfield used the occasion to expand the doctrine
of nemo turpitudinem suam allegans audietur' by declaring that the ver-
dict could not be disturbed solely on the basis of affidavits from jurors.
Instead, to show jury misconduct "the Court must derive their knowl-
edge from some person having seen the [misconduct] through a window,
or by some such means."2
The Mansfield Rule was carried over to the United States and ap-
'No man alleging his own infamy will be heard. Also expressed as allegans suain
turpitudinum non est audiendus; one who alleges his own infamy is not to be he/rd.
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